Approved For Release 2007/10/22 : CIA-RDP85-00024R000300750002-8

[redacted] ROUTING AND TRANSM[redacted]L SLIP

Date 3/16

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. D/FBIS		
2.		
3. DD/FBIS		
4.		
5. ExecReg C/Ops		

	Action		File		Note and Return
	Approval		For Clearance		Per Conversation
	As Requested		For Correction		Prepare Reply
	Circulate		For Your Information		See Me
	Comment		Investigate		Signature
	Coordination		Justify		

REMARKS Some of this is pretty predictable British labor reasoning, as you note. U.S. payments to BBC, small as they are, do make jobs for Brits who are free to join a union. It doesn't follow that if FBIS withdrew its payments BBC would get funds to do the work we want done. What would happen to BBC's employees if the payments were stopped is essentially BBC's problem and something we shouldn't get near. (ove

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
C/Ops	Phone No.

5041-102

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

Approved For Release 2007/10/22 : CIA-RDP85-00024R000300750002-8

Approved For Release 2007/10/22 : CIA-RDP85-00024R000300750002-8

principal and BBC the agent for the work at Caversham is sheer nonsense.

We've understood for a long time that in the event of a strike which shut down the Monitoring Service we couldn't step in and man the listening posts. Whether we could give BBC some of their own coverage which we monitored elsewhere is another question and probably would depend on which union ~~we~~ ~~we~~ was involved.

The concern over a strike is one of the reasons we have worried over the years about the near wipeout of FBIS' Russian monitoring capability. It's been the old rock and hard place: our cost cutters said, "Hold down staff and rely on the BBC to do it," their paymasters are saying "Hold down costs and let the Americans pay."

Approved For Release 2007/10/22 : CIA-RDP85-00024R000300750002-8

Approved For Release 2007/10/22 : CIA-RDP85-00024R000300750002-8

MLD-2012

22 February 1982

[redacted] Director STAT
Foreign Broadcast Information Service

SUBJECT: Relations with B.B.C., Approach from British Union

Dear John:

[redacted] may have mentioned to you the request I had STAT
from [redacted] assistant secretary of the Association of STAT
Broadcasting Staff, for a talk regarding membership in his union for our British Staff. ABS is one of the two unions that are active at Caversham, the other being the National Union of Journalists. I have attached a memorandum on the substance of the conversation, which took place last Friday. It was a cordial talk, despite the lack of agreement.

What the whole thing represents, in my view, is a sort of shot across the bow, not at us but at the B.B.C.. I got a very clear impression from both [redacted] that in their view the STAT
picture is gloomy indeed and that the Monitoring Service's luck in staving off redundancies is about to run out. For that reason, they are keenly interested in preventing the Monitoring Service from acquiring any flexibility in their operations through their liaisons with other monitoring services. Any attempt on our part to ease the impact of an industrial dispute on the Monitoring Service would be quickly countered.

[redacted] is right, in a way, about the effect of the several STAT
commissions, so to speak, that we have given to the B.B.C.. Their budgeteers can very well say at almost every turn, "Well, why do you have to have the money? Why not persuade the Americans to fork up?" This is the slippery slope [redacted] was worried about when we STAT
came up with these proposals two years ago. For my part, I hope we have reached the bottom and can get back to the relationship we had before, where no money changed hands.

But it is quite possible we have not reached bottom yet from the B.B.C.'s side. I had a curious question from [redacted] the STAT
Monitoring Service's administrator, yesterday when I relayed to him the substance of the talks with Banks. He was asked by someone, he said, whether FBIS paid for the space they used in the Caversham building. Being new here, he said, he was not able to give a confident reply. I gave [redacted] the background on the PMU rent but STAT
said that we had never been charged for the other space we occupy, that this had always been part of the deal in our liaison with them.

Approved For Release 2007/10/22 : CIA-RDP85-00024R000300750002-8

Approved For Release 2007/10/22 : CIA-RDP85-00024R000300750002-8

If the person who asked this question was an FCO or MOD budgeteer there may be some pressure put on the BBC to get us to pay rent. I am reasonably sure Witherow would resist this but can't be positive; certainly the balance in our exchange is heavily in our favor and Witherow knows it.

Sincerely,

STAT

Chief, London Bureau

cc: Chief, Operations Group

Approved For Release 2007/10/22 : CIA-RDP85-00024R000300750002-8

Approved For Release 2007/10/22 : CIA-RDP85-00024R000300750002-8

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - TALK WITH ABS

As he had requested, I met with [redacted], assistant general secretary of the Association of Broadcasting Staff, at our Embassy office on 19 February to discuss the question of ABS membership for FBIS's British staff. [redacted] was accompanied by [redacted], head of one of the ABS units at Crowsley/ Caversham. [redacted] FBIS Administrative officer, also attended.

[redacted] began by giving some of the historical background for ABS, noting that in past labor disputes they had bent over backward to see that the Monitoring Service was minimally affected, in part because of the repercussions any disruption would have on the B.B.C.'s partner F.B.I.S.. The B.B.C. External Services over the years, he said, had managed to avoid budget cuts and redundancies which other parts of the External Services had suffered but that the future did not look promising. He was worried about the relationship the Monitoring Service had with other monitoring services and what he saw as a trend on the part of the Service to get these organizations to do for the Monitoring Service work which the service itself ought to do. This put the Monitoring Service in the position of being an agent for other services and not, as it should be, a fully independent entity.

He felt this trend was weakening the Monitoring Service vis a vis its British paymasters and without some sort of representation with FBIS his union was always in the position of dealing with the agent, not the principal, when it came to discussion of personnel disputes and other matters. He cited as specific examples of this agent relationship the FBIS partial funding of the [redacted], the building of the satellite antenna, though he was aware, he said, that the B.B.C. was to run this antenna, and the Islamabad remote monitoring project. [redacted] alleged, as an example of such a difficulty that the B.B.C. employee who mans the Caversham end of the Islamabad circuit had had his hours severely disrupted and that when objections were made the reply was "we must do what F.B.I.S. wants.") [redacted] also asked what the effect on its employees would be if the B.B.C.'s source of funds for such projects were terminated.)

It was my view that these projects, which did not indicate a trend, did not threaten the Monitoring Service's independence and did create jobs for British employees, who were, moreover, B.B.C. employees not FBIS's and were therefore accessible to the union. As for what would happen to such employees were outside funding to cease, I was sure the Monitoring Service had agreements about the proper handling of redundancies and that they would be followed.

Approved For Release 2007/10/22 : CIA-RDP85-00024R000300750002-8

Approved For Release 2007/10/22 : CIA-RDP85-00024R000300750002-8

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - TALK WITH ABS (continued)

[redacted] then went on to the question of FBIS employees. STAT
Could some sort of liaison be set up between the union and FBIS to handle problems that our employees might be having with FBIS and that B.B.C. employees might have? My reply was that such a liaison setup would be tacit recognition of the union and that I could not by regulation allow it. Our employees, by British law, were entitled to join a union if they chose to do so, and I could not prevent ABS from engaging in recruiting efforts, but that was the extent of what was possible. I said I didn't see what point union membership would have for our employees and in fact in nearly two years as chief of the bureau had never been approached by any of our British staff on the subject. Conditions of service, I thought, were well understood and there were proper grievance procedures that were available to all our employees. [redacted] STAT
asked, at this point, whether there were any tribunals (British) outside FBIS to which our employees could appeal. I said there were not.

In short, there were two channels of communication: for FBIS employees their supervisory channels, and for problems having to do with our relationship with the Monitoring Service the official liaison links we had long since established with the Monitoring Service management.

[redacted] concluded by saying that while FBIS had been largely STAT
ignored by the union so far, that would no longer be the case. He saw the trend as being one of increasing dependence by the Monitoring Service on outside agencies and he did not want that to continue. [redacted] said that in the event of an industrial STAT
dispute if FBIS tried to take over some of the Monitoring Service's coverage and give the output back to the BBC, his union members would be instructed not to handle it. [redacted] said, in addition, STAT
one of the measures the union was taking to preserve jobs was to take an increasingly hard line against the rehiring of retired Monitoring Service employees on temporary contracts. That would cease, he said, for all but those cases where no qualified new hires could be found.

[redacted] said that the union would engage in STAT
recruiting for FBIS members and that was where the matter was left.

[redacted] STAT

22 Feb. 1982
Date

Chief, London Bureau

Approved For Release 2007/10/22 : CIA-RDP85-00024R000300750002-8